The work argues that engaging Africa's cultural and epistemic resources as social imaginaries, and not as metaphysical or ontological “essences,” could help practitioners of African philosophy overcome the cluster of shortcomings and undesirable features associated with “ethnophilosophy.” A number of points are outlined to buttress this claim. First, the framework of social imaginaries does not operate with the false assumption that Africa's cultural forms and epistemic resources are static and immutable. Second, this framework does not lend itself to sweeping generalizations (...) about Africa or large swathes of it. Third, the framework of social imaginaries remedies ethnophilosophy's problem of collectivism. Fourth, unlike ethnophilosophy, it does not romanticize and canonize a supposedly “idyllic” African past, which militates against a realistic and forward‐looking philosophizing. Finally, with the framework of social imaginaries, Africa's indigenous cultural and epistemic resources become amenable to being engaged with critical philosophical rigor. This not only enhances their potential for cross‐cultural philosophical conversation but also enhances their usefulness for addressing current sociopolitical issues affecting Africa. The discussion in this paper somewhat touches upon the question of method in African philosophy, using the ethnophilosophy problem to navigate the vast gamut of issues involved. (shrink)

The sense of interconnectedness is perhaps one of the most celebrated features of African thought. It has been theorized under different philosophical idioms among African philosophers. It has appeared variously as African metaphysics, ontology, socialism and even religion—all in a bid to underline the basic idea that aspects of reality are inextricably interconnected and mutually impact one another in a seemingly universal web of interaction. While each of the idioms used to express this idea has some merits, the article privileges (...) the epistemic idiom. To support this move, I make two mutually reinforcing arguments. First, it is appropriate to describe the sense of interconnectedness in epistemic terms because it is primarily a mode of knowing/perceiving the world. Second, and more importantly, the epistemic idiom is useful for the formulation of emancipatory demands and formation of epistemic alliances against the subjugation of African and non-Western knowledges by mechanisms of coloniality. (shrink)

The paper has two complementary objectives. First, it sustains an analysis of the concept of ‘coloniality’ that accounts for the epistemic imbalance in the modern world, demonstrating precisely how Africa is adversely affected, having been caught up in the throes of coloniality and its epistemic implications. Second – and complementarily – the paper attempts to bring this very concept of ‘coloniality’ into the discourse on Africa’s emigration crisis, arguing that Africa’s emigration crisis is traceable, inter alia, to the epistemic imbalance (...) in the very structure of modernity. This imbalance results from the stifling of Africa’s epistemic resources under Western epistemic hegemony. Epistemic coloniality, of course interacting with some material factors, creates a sufficient condition for emigration. It is further theorized that the apparent lack of epistemic will on the part of Africans to mobilize some surviving epistemic resources to address some problems on their own is also a function of coloniality. (shrink)

This article primarily sets out to investigate whether Igbo (African) thoughts on death might be considered Heideggerian or not. It does so by analysing and juxtaposing five key elements of Heidegger’s existentialist analysis of Dasein’s death with some important features of Igbo (African) thoughts on death. This is aimed at challenging an identifiable attempt by scholars like Chukwuelobe and Onwuanibe to couch the Igbo metaphysics of death in Heideggerian terms. Therefore, the main argument of the article is that the important (...) features of Igbo thoughts on death, as outlined by these scholars, substantially conflict with key elements of Heidegger’s existentialist analysis of Dasein’s death. To make this case, the article thoroughly examines the key elements in both the Heideggerian and the Igbo frameworks, showing that they could hardly be reconciled. Though the article identifies some scholars and zeroes in on them, it simultaneously serves a larger pre-emptive purpose of pointing out the many hurdles that may have to be overcome in any attempt to align Igbo thoughts on death with Heidegger’s framework. This pre-emptive aspect is a worthwhile philosophical task in itself, given that the theme of death occupies an important place in both the existentialist tradition and in Igbo philosophy. (shrink)

The sense of interconnectedness is perhaps one of the most celebrated features of African thought. It has been theorized under different philosophical idioms among African philosophers. It has appeared variously as African metaphysics, ontology, socialism and even religion—all in a bid to underline the basic idea that aspects of reality are inextricably interconnected and mutually impact one another in a seemingly universal web of interaction. While each of the idioms used to express this idea has some merits, the article privileges (...) the epistemic idiom. To support this move, I make two mutually reinforcing arguments. First, it is appropriate to describe the sense of interconnectedness in epistemic terms because it is primarily a mode of knowing/perceiving the world. Second, and more importantly, the epistemic idiom is useful for the formulation of emancipatory demands and formation of epistemic alliances against the subjugation of African and non-Western knowledges by mechanisms of coloniality. (shrink)

The central argument of this article is that there is a remarkable conceptual parallel between Hegel’s famous notion of the “cunning of Reason” and the philosophically profound concept of Chi in Igbo metaphysics. By way of establishing this parallel, the article advances the following subsidiary but complementary points: Chi is also “cunning” in its dynamics; both principles (i.e. Chi and Reason/Spirit) are non-deterministic because they try to maintain a dialectic balance between destiny and individual responsibility; both possess divine attributes; and (...) community serves as an invaluable medium of operation for both. The scholarly significance of the article lies in its attempt not only to systematise the Igbo thought on Chi by eliminating the vestiges of discredited “ethno-philosophy”, but also to open up a constructive dialogue between Hegel and elements of African philosophy, using Igbo metaphysics as a placeholder. This is against the backdrop of certain discontents generated by Hegel’s famous uncomplimentary and racist remarks on Africa. Seen in this light, the article may well be an exercise in “rapprochement”. (shrink)

This article theorizes the modernization dynamics of the Igbo world, using the Habermasian framework. Drawing on Habermas, it argues that Igbo modernity or, more precisely, the transformations associated with Igbo modernization, may be understood in terms of the “uncoupling” of systems from the Igbo lifeworld. Relatedly, it further argues that the crises and pathologies that attend modernity in Igboland owe largely to the “colonization” of the Igbo lifeworld by systems of modernity consequent upon this uncoupling. The article pays special attention (...) to the realm of the lifeworld because it is a neglected sphere in the scholarship on the Igbo experience of modernity. Besides, focusing on the Igbo lifeworld would provide the much-needed contextualized reading—one steeped in Africa—of Habermas’s important but rather rarefied theory of modernity. The significance of the article perhaps lies in this two-pronged engagement—the focus on lifeworld and the attempt to contextualize Habermas. (shrink)